Partial monitoring is a general model for sequential learning with limited feedback formalized as a game between two players. In this game, the learner chooses an action and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome, then the learner suffers a loss and receives a feedback signal. The goal of the learner is to minimize the total loss. In this paper, we study partial monitoring with finite actions and stochastic outcomes. We derive a logarithmic distribution-dependent regret lower bound that defines the hardness of the problem. Inspired by the DMED algorithm (Honda and Takemura, 2010) for the multi-armed bandit problem, we propose PM-DMED, an algorithm that minimizes the distribution-dependent regret. PM-DMED significantly outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms in numerical experiments. To show the optimality of PM-DMED with respect to the regret bound, we slightly modify the algorithm by introducing a hinge function (PM-DMED-Hinge). Then, we derive an asymptotically optimal regret upper bound of PM-DMED-Hinge that matches the lower bound.
Introduction
Partial monitoring is a general framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback. Many classes of problems, including prediction with expert advice [1] , the multi-armed bandit problem [2] , dynamic pricing [3] , the dark pool problem [4] , label efficient prediction [5] , and linear and convex optimization with full or bandit feedback [6, 7] can be modeled as an instance of partial monitoring.
Partial monitoring is formalized as a repeated game played by two players called a learner and an opponent. At each round, the learner chooses an action, and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome. Then, the learner observes a feedback signal from a given set of symbols and suffers some loss, both of which are deterministic functions of the selected action and outcome.
The goal of the learner is to find the optimal action that minimizes his/her cumulative loss. Alternatively, we can define the regret as the difference between the cumulative losses of the learner and the single optimal action, and minimization of the loss is equivalent to minimization of the regret. A learner with a small regret balances exploration (acquisition of information about the strategy of the opponent) and exploitation (utilization of information). The rate of regret indicates how fast the learner adapts to the problem: a linear regret indicates the inability of the learner to find the optimal action, whereas a sublinear regret indicates that the learner can approach the optimal action given sufficiently large time steps.
Problem Setup
This paper studies the finite stochastic partial monitoring problem with N actions, M outcomes, and A symbols. An instance of the partial monitoring game is defined by a loss matrix L = (l i,j ) ∈ R N ×M and a feedback matrix H = (h i,j ) ∈ [A] N ×M , where [A] = {1, 2, . . . , A}. At the beginning, the learner is informed of L and H. At each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , a learner selects an action i(t) ∈ [N ], and at the same time an opponent selects an outcome j(t) ∈ [M ]. The learner suffers loss l i(t),j(t) , which he/she cannot observe: the only information the learner receives is the signal h i(t),j(t) ∈ [A]. We consider a stochastic opponent whose strategy for selecting outcomes is governed by the opponent's strategy p * ∈ P M , where P M is a set of probability distributions over an M -ary outcome. The outcome j(t) of each round is an i.i.d. sample from p * . The goal of the learner is to minimize the cumulative loss over T rounds. Let the optimal action be the one that minimizes the loss in expectation, that is, i * = arg min i∈[N ] L ⊤ i p * , where L i is the i-th row of L. Assume that i * is unique. Without loss of generality, we can assume that i * = 1. Let ∆ i = (L i − L 1 ) ⊤ p * ∈ [0, ∞) and N i (t) be the number of rounds before the t-th in which action i is selected. The performance of the algorithm is measured by the (pseudo) regret, ∆ i N i (T + 1), which is the difference between the expected loss of the learner and the optimal action 1. It is easy to see that minimizing the loss is equivalent to minimizing the regret. The expectation of the regret measures the performance of an algorithm that the learner uses.
Regret(T ) =
For each action i ∈ [N ], let C i be the set of opponent strategies for which action i is optimal:
We call C i the optimality cell of action i. Each optimality cell is a convex closed polytope. Furthermore, we call the set of optimality cells {C 1 , . . . , C N } the cell decomposition as shown in Figure 1 . Let C c i = P M \ C i be the set of strategies with which action i is not optimal. The signal matrix
, where 1 1 [X] = 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise. The signal matrix defined here is slightly different from the one in the previous papers (e.g., Bartók et al. [10] ) in which the number of rows of S i is the number of the different symbols in the i-th row of H. The advantage in using the definition here is that, S i p * ∈ R A is a probability distribution over symbols that the algorithm observes when it selects an action i. Examples of signal matrices are shown in Section 5. An instance of partial monitoring is globally observable if for all pairs i, j of actions,
In this paper, we exclusively deal with globally observable instances: in view of the minimax regret, this includes trivial, easy, and hard problems.
Regret Lower Bound
A good algorithm should work well against any opponent's strategy. We extend this idea by introducing the notion of strong consistency: a partial monitoring algorithm is strongly consistent if it satisfies E[Regret(T )] = o(T a ) for any a > 0 and p ∈ P M given L and H.
In the context of the multi-armed bandit problem, Lai and Robbins [2] derived the regret lower bound of a strongly consistent algorithm: an algorithm must select each arm i until its number of draws
is the KL divergence between the two one-parameter distributions from which the rewards of action i and the optimal action are generated. Analogously, in the partial monitoring problem, we can define the minimum number of observations. Lemma 1. For sufficiently large T , a strongly consistent algorithm satisfies:
where
is the KL divergence between two discrete distributions, in which we define 0 log 0/0 = 0.
Lemma 1 can be interpreted as follows: for each round t, consistency requires the algorithm to make sure that the possible risk that action i = 1 is optimal is smaller than 1/t. Large deviation principle [16] states that, the probability that an opponent with strategy q behaves like p * is
. Therefore, we need to continue exploration of the actions until i N i (t)D(p * i S i q) ∼ log t holds for any q ∈ C c 1 to reduce the risk to exp (− log t) = 1/t. The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B in the supplementary material. Based on the technique used in Lai and Robbins [2] , the proof considers a modified game in which another action i = 1 is optimal. The difficulty in proving the lower bound in partial monitoring lies in that, the feedback structure can be quite complex: for example, to confirm the superiority of action 1 over 2, one might need to use the feedback from action 3 / ∈ {1, 2}. Still, we can derive the lower bound by utilizing the consistency of the algorithm in the original and modified games.
We next derive a lower bound on the regret based on Lemma 1. Note that, the expectation of the regret can be expressed as
where cl(·) denotes a closure. Moreover, let for i(t) ∈ Z C in an arbitrarily fixed order do 5: Select i(t), and receive feedback.
6:
Z R ← Z R \ {i(t)}.
7:
Add actions to Z N in accordance with Algorithm 2 (PM-DMED) Algorithm 3 (PM-DMED-Hinge) .
8:
t ← t + 1.
9:
end for 10: 
then put them into Z N . 5: If
and put all actions i such that i / ∈ Z R and r * i > N i (t)/ log t into Z N .
Necessity of
√ log T exploration: PM-DMED tries to observe each action to some extent (Eq. (2) The optimal action here is action 1, which does not yield any useful information. By using action 2, one receives three kinds of symbols from which one can estimate (p * ) 1 , (p * ) 2 + (p * ) 3 , and (p * ) 4 , where (p * ) j is the j-th component of p * . From this, an algorithm can find that (p * ) 1 is not very small and thus the expected loss of actions 2 and 3 is larger than that of action 1. Since the feedback of actions 2 and 3 are the same, one may also use action 3 in the same manner. However, the loss per observation is 1.2 and 1.3 for actions 2 and 3, respectively, and thus it is better to use action 2. This difference comes from the fact that (p
Since an algorithm does not know p * beforehand, it needs to observe action 4, the only source for distinguishing (p * ) 2 from (p * ) 3 . Yet, an optimal algorithm cannot select it more than Ω(log T ) times because it affects the O(log T ) factor in the regret. In fact, O((log T ) a ) observations of action 4 with some a > 0 are sufficient to be convinced that (p * ) 2 < (p * ) 3 with probability 1 − o(1/T poly(a) ). For this reason, PM-DMED selects each action √ log t times.
Experiment
Following Bartók et al. [11] , we compared the performances of algorithms in three different games: the four-state game (Section 4), a three-state game and dynamic pricing. Experiments on the Narmed bandit game was also done, and the result is shown in Appendix C.1.
The three-state game, which is classified as easy in terms of the minimax regret, is characterized by: Dynamic pricing, which is classified as hard in terms of the minimax regret, is a game that models a repeated auction between a seller (learner) and a buyer (opponent). At each round, the seller sets a price for a product, and at the same time, the buyer secretly sets a maximum price he is willing to pay. The signal is "buy" or "no-buy", and the seller's loss is either a given constant (no-buy) or the difference between the buyer's and the seller's prices (buy). The loss and feedback matrices are:
where signals 1 and 2 correspond to no-buy and buy. The signal matrix of action i is
Following Bartók et al. [11] , we set N = 5, M = 5, and c = 2.
In our experiments with the three-state game and dynamic pricing, we tested three settings regarding the harshness of the opponent: at the beginning of a simulation, we sampled 1,000 points uniformly at random from P M , then sorted them by C *
We chose the top 10%, 50%, and 90% harshest ones as the opponent's strategy in the harsh, intermediate, and benign settings, respectively.
We compared Random, FeedExp3 [8] , CBP [11] with α = 1.01, BPM-LEAST, BPM-TS [13] , and PM-DMED with c = 1. Random is a naive algorithm that selects an action uniformly random. FeedExp3 requires a matrix G such that H ⊤ G = L ⊤ , and thus one cannot apply it to the four-state game. CBP is an algorithm of logarithmic regret for easy games. The parameters η and f (t) of CBP were set in accordance with Theorem 1 in their paper. BPM-LEAST is a Bayesian algorithm withÕ( √ T ) regret for easy games, and BPM-TS is a heuristic of state-of-the-art performance. The priors of two BPMs were set to be uninformative to avoid a misspecification, as recommended in their paper.
Algorithm 3 PM-DMED-Hinge subroutine for adding actions to Z N (without duplication).
and put all actions such that i / ∈ Z R and r
The computation ofp(t) in (1) and the evaluation of the condition in (3) involve convex optimizations, which were done with Ipopt [18] . Moreover, obtaining {r * i } in (4) is classified as a linear semi-infinite programming (LSIP) problem, a linear programming (LP) with finitely many variables and infinitely many constraints. Following the optimization of BPM-LEAST [13] , we resorted to a finite sample approximation and used the Gurobi LP solver [19] in computing {r * i }: at each round, we sampled 1,000 points from P M , and relaxed the constraints on the samples. To speed up the computation, we skipped these optimizations in most rounds with large t and used the result of the last computation. The computation of the coefficient C * 1 (p * , {p * i }) of the regret lower bound (Theorem 2) is also an LSIP, which was approximated by 100,000 sample points from C c 1 .
The experimental results are shown in Figure 2 . In the four-state game and the other two games with an easy or intermediate opponent, PM-DMED outperforms the other algorithms when the number of rounds is large. In particular, in the dynamic pricing game with an intermediate opponent, the regret of PM-DMED at T = 10 6 is ten times smaller than those of the other algorithms. Even in the harsh setting in which the minimax regret matters, PM-DMED has some advantage over all algorithms except for BPM-TS. With sufficiently large T , the slope of an optimal algorithm should converge to LB. In all games and settings, the slope of PM-DMED converges to LB, which is empirical evidence of the optimality of PM-DMED.
Theoretical Analysis
Section 5 shows that the empirical performance of PM-DMED is very close to the regret lower bound in Theorem 2. Although the authors conjecture that PM-DMED is optimal, it is hard to analyze PM-DMED. The technically hardest part arises from the case in which the divergence of each action is small but not yet fully converged. To circumvent this difficulty, we can introduce a discount factor. Let
means that the number of observations {N i (t)} is enough to ensure that the "{δ i }-discounted" empirical divergence of each q ∈ C c 1 is larger than log t. Analogous to R j ({p i , δ i }), we define
and its optimal solution by
We also define
, the optimal region of action i with margin. PM-DMED-Hinge shares the main routine of Algorithm 1 with PM-DMED and lists the next actions by Algorithm 3. Unlike PM-DMED, it (i) discounts f (N i (t)) from the empirical divergence D(p i (t) S i q). Moreover, (ii) whenp(t) is close to the cell boundary, it encourages more exploration to identify the cell it belongs to by Eq. (6).
Theorem 3. Assume the following regularity conditions hold for
for all δ ≥ 0 in some neighborhood of δ = 0, where cl(·) and int(·) denote the closure and the interior, respectively. Then,
We prove this theorem in Appendix D. Recall that R *
is the set of optimal solutions of an LSIP. In this problem, KKT conditions and the duality theorem apply as in the case of finite constraints; thus, we can check whether Condition 1 holds or not for each p * (see, e.g., Ito et al. [20] and references therein). Condition 2 holds in most cases, and an example of an exceptional case is shown in Appendix A. [2] . Namely, C *
Corollary 4, which is proven in Appendix C, states that PM-DMED-Hinge attains the optimal regret of the N -armed bandit if we run it on an N -armed bandit game represented as partial monitoring.
Asymptotic analysis: it is Theorem 6 where we lose the finite-time property. This theorem shows the continuity of the optimal solution set R *
To obtain an explicit bound, we need sensitivity analysis, the theory of the robustness of the optimal value and the solution for small deviations of its parameters (see e.g., Fiacco [21] ). In particular, the optimal solution of partial monitoring involves an infinite number of constraints, which makes the analysis quite hard. For this reason, we will not perform a finite-time analysis. Note that, the N -armed bandit problem is a special instance in which we can avoid solving the above optimization and a finite-time optimal bound is known.
Necessity of the discount factor: we are not sure whether discount factor f (n) in PM-DMEDHinge is necessary or not. We also empirically tested PM-DMED-Hinge: although it is better than the other algorithms in many settings, such as dynamic pricing with an intermediate opponent, it is far worse than PM-DMED. We found that our implementation, which uses the Ipopt nonlinear optimization solver, was sometimes inaccurate at optimizing (5): there were some cases in which the true p
, while the solutionp(t) we obtained had non-zero hinge values. In this case, the algorithm lists all actions from (7), which degrades performance. Determining whether the discount factor is essential or not is our future work. The authors consider that it is quite hard to give the optimal regret bound without such regularity conditions. In fact, many regularity conditions are assumed in Graves and Lai [22] , where another generalization of the bandit problem is considered and the regret lower bound is expressed in terms of LSIP. In this paper, the regularity conditions are much simplified by the continuity argument in Theorem 6 but it remains an open problem to fully remove them.
A Case in which Condition 2 Does Not Hold

B Proof: Regret Lower Bound
In this section, we prove Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. The technique here is mostly inspired from Theorem 1 in Lai and Robbins [2] . The use of a √ T term is inspired from Kaufmann et al. [23] . Let p ′ ∈ int(C c 1 ) and i ′ = 1 be the optimal action under the opponent's strategy p ′ . We consider a modified partial monitoring game with its opponent's strategy is p ′ .
Notation: LetX
is the signal of the m-th observation of action i. Let
and KL = i∈[N ] KL i (N i (T )). Let P ′ and E ′ be the probability and the expectation with respect to the modified game, respectively. Then, for any event E,
holds. Now, let us define the following events:
First step (Pr[D 12 ] = o(1)): from (12),
By using this we have
T − √ T (by the Markov inequality).
Since this algorithm is strongly consistent,
for any a > 0. Therefore, the RHS of the last line of (13) is o(T a−ǫ/2 ), which, by choosing sufficiently small a, converges to zero as T → ∞. In summary, Pr[D 12 ] = o(1).
Second step (Pr[D 1\2 ] = o(1)): we have
is the maximum of the sum of positive-mean random variables, and thus converges to is average (c.f., Lemma 10.5 in [24] ). Namely,
almost surely. Therefore,
log T → 1 − ǫ almost surely. By using this fact and 1 − ǫ/2 > 1 − ǫ, we have
In summary, we obtain Pr D 1\2 = o(1).
Last step: we here have
where we used the fact that {A < C} ∩ {B < C} ⊇ {A + B < C} for A, B > 0 in the last line. Note that, by using the result of the previous steps, Pr[
. By using the complementary of this fact,
Using the Markov inequality yields
Because E[N i ′ (T )] is subpolynomial as a function of T due to the consistency, the second term in LHS of (14) is o(1) and thus negligible. Lemma 1 follows from the fact that (14) holds for sufficiently small ǫ and arbitrary p ′ ∈ int(C c 1 ).
Proof of Theorem 2.
Assume that there exists δ > 0 and a sequence
From the definition of C * 1 , there exists q
Since S is compact, there exists a subsequence t 0 < t 1 < · · · such that lim u→∞ q ′ tu = q ′ for some q ′ ∈ S. Therefore from the lower semicontinuity of the divergence we obtain
which contradicts Lemma 1.
C The N-armed Bandit Problem as Partial Monitoring
In Section 6, we have introduced PM-DMED-Hinge, an asymptotically optimal algorithm for partial monitoring. In this appendix, we prove that this algorithm also has an optimal regret bound of the N -armed bandit problem when we run it on an N -armed bandit game represented as an instance of partial monitoring.
In the N -armed bandit problem, the learner selects one of N actions (arms) and receives a corresponding reward. This problem can be considered as a special case of partial monitoring in which the learner directly observes the loss matrix. For example, three-armed Bernoulli bandit can be represented by the following loss and feedback matrices, and the strategy: , and
where µ 1 , µ 2 , and µ 3 are the expected rewards of the actions. Signals 1 and 2 correspond to the rewards of 1 and 0 generated by the selected arm, respectively. More generally, N -armed Bernoulli bandit is represented as an instance of partial monitoring in which the loss and feedback matrices are the same N × 2 N matrix
where mod denotes the modulo operation. This problem is associated with N parameters µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ N that correspond to the expected rewards of the actions. For the ease of analysis, we assume {µ i } are in (0, 1) and different from each other. Without loss of generality, we assume 1 > µ 1 > µ 2 > · · · > µ N > 0, and thus action 1 is the optimal action. The opponent's strategy is
Note that µ i = (S i p * ) 1 .
Proof of Corollary 4.
In the following, we prove that the regularity conditions in Theorem 3 are always satisfied in the case of the N -armed bandit. During the proof we also show that C * 1 (p * , {p * i }) is equal to the optimal constant factor of Lai and Robbins [2] .
Because signal 1 corresponds to the reward of 1, we can defineμ i (q) = (S i q) 1 , and thus
First, we show the uniqueness of R *
where d(a b) is the KL divergence between two Bernoulli distributions with parameters a and b. Then
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
,
, which is unique.
Second, we show that cl(int(C
it suffices to show that, an open ball centered at any position in contains a point in int(C c 1 ) ∩ S δ . This holds because we can make a slight move towards the direction of increasingμ i ′ : we can always find q
′ in an open ball centered at q such that
because of (i) the fact that there always exists q ∈ P M such that {q ∈ P M , ∀ i∈[N ]μi (q) = µ i } for arbitrary {µ i } ∈ (0, 1) N and (ii) the continuity of theμ i operator. Therefore, any open ball centered at q ∈ cl(C c 1 ) ∩ S δ contains an element of int(C c 1 ) ∩ S δ , by which we obtain (17) . By using (17), we have
where we used the fact that cl(cl(X)) = cl(X). Combining (18) with the fact that cl(cl(C
Therefore, in the N -armed Bernoulli bandit problem, the regularity conditions are always satisfied and C * 1 (p * , {p * i }) matches the optimal coefficient of the logarithmic regret bound. From Theorem 3, if we run PM-DMED-Hinge in this game, its expected regret is asymptotically optimal in view of the N -armed bandit problem.
C.1 Experiment
We also assessed the performance of PM-DMED and other algorithms in solving the three-armed Bernoulli bandit game defined by (15) with parameters µ 1 = 0.4, µ 2 = 0.3, and µ 3 = 0.2. The settings of the algorithms are the same as that of the main paper. The results of simulations are shown in Figure 4 . LB-Theory is the regret lower bound of Lai and Robbins [2] , that is, i =1 ∆i log t d(µi µ1) . The slope of PM-DMED quickly approaches that of LB-Theory, which is empirical evidence that PM-DMED has optimal performance in N -armed bandits.
D Optimality of PM-DMED-Hinge
In this appendix we prove Theorem 3. First we define distances among distributions. For distributions p i , p ′ i ∈ P A of symbols we use the total variation distance
For distributions p, p ′ ∈ P M of outcomes, we identify p with the set {p ′ : ∀i,
In the following, we use Pinsker's inequality given below many times.
Note that these two constants are positive from the global observability.
D.1 Properties of regret lower bound
In this section, we give Lemma 5 and Theorem 6 that are about the functions C *
In the following, we always consider these functions on p ∈ P M , p i ∈ {S i p : supp(p) ⊂ supp(p * )} and δ i ≥ 0, where supp(·) denotes the support of the distribution.
We define
Lemma 5. Let p ∈ C j,α and {p i , δ i } be satisfying
Furtheremore, R j ({p i , δ i }) is nonempty and
For this i we have
Thus, by letting r i = 4/(αρ j,L α) 2 for all i = j we have
which implies (19) . On the other hand it holds for any {r *
and therefore we have
Theorem 6. Assume that the regularity conditions in Theorem 3 hold. Then the point-to-set map
See Hogan [25] for definitions of terms such as continuity of point-to-set maps.
Proof of Theorem 6. Definē
is a closed set and therefore R *
From the continuity of D(p i S i q) at any q such that D(p i S i q) < ∞, we have
Thus, we havē
Since the objective 
for a sequence {p
Take an arbitrary q ∈ int(C
Thus, from q ∈ int(C c 1 ), it holds for sufficiently large m that q
Therefore for sufficiently large m we have
and, letting m → ∞,
This means that {r
We show that there exists a sequence {r
Consider the optimal value function
Since the feasible region of (21) is closed at p i = S i p * , δ i = 0 and the objective function of (21) 
D.2 Regret analysis of PM-DMED-Hinge
Letp i,n ∈ [0, 1] A be the empirical distribution of the symbols from the action i when the action i is selected n times. Then we havep i (t) =p i,Ni(t) . Let
Then, from the large deviation bound on discrete distributions (Theorem 11.2.1 in Cover and Thomas [26] ), we have
define events
Lemma 10.
Lemma 11.
Lemma 12.
Lemma 13.
Proof of Lemma 7 . From D(t) we have
Here assume that
(by Pinsker's inequality)
(by definition of B(t))
which contradicts (26) and we obtain p(t) − p * M ≤ 2 √ δ. Furthermore, from B(t) and E(t) we have
where r * i is the unique member of R * 1 (p * , {S i p * , 0}) and we used the fact that A ′ (t) impliesî(t) = 1.
We complete the proof by Proof of Lemma 8. First, we obtain from D(t) and E(t) that f (N i (t)) ≤ (ρ 1,L α(t)) 2 /4 and
Therefore, from Lemma 5, it holds for any {r * i } i =1 ∈ R * j (p(t), {p i (t), f (N i (t))}) that
Now we have
Here, note that
Since N i (t) ≥ (log log T ) 1/3 holds under event E(t), we can bound the probability in (27) as and combining this with (27) we have
Pr
≤ O (log T )(log log T ) 3 e −Θ((log log T ) 1/3 )
= o(log T ) .
Proof of Lemma 9. Let G ∈ 2
[N ] \ ∅ and {n i } i∈G ∈ N |G| be arbitrary. Consider the case that
for some x > 0. Then under events t ≥ e x , i∈G {N i (t) = n i }, A c (t), C(t) and H({p i (t), f (n i )}) = G we have :D(pî (t) (t) Sî (t) p)≤f (Nî (t) (t)) i N i (t)(D(p i (t) S i p) − f (N i (t))) + ≤ i n i (D(p i (t) S i p * ) − f (n i )) + < x ≤ log t , which implies that the condition (9) is satisfied. On the other hand from (10), {r * i } satisfies i∈G (r * i log t)(D(p i (t) S i p) − f (n i )) + ≥ log t .
Eqs. (28) and (29) imply that there exists at least one i ∈ G such that r * i log t > N i (t) = n i . This action is selected within N rounds and therefore N i (t ′ ) = n i never holds for all t ′ ≥ t + N . Thus, under the condition (28) it holds that t 1 1 A c (t), C(t), H({p i (t), N i (t)}) = G, i∈G {N i (t) = n i } ≤ e x + N .
By using this inequality we have The first integral is bounded as 
